Remember when everyone was hailing the hands-off, softer touch British approach? You remember, patrolling without kevlar or helmets, blah blah blah. Well, here's what you get. No one is doing anything, apparently, to advise or support secular parties -- or to get utilities running. That's left a vacumn that religious parties have quickly organized to fill. This is a textbook example of the case I've been making. It's the extreme parties that organize fastest (in this case, not only in terms of party platform, but also in terms of seizing the opportunities provided by the collapse of government.) And don't think in terms of "Shia" dominance. These are all Shia.
And, by the way, who says things are going so well in Basra anyway? The publisher of an English language publication in Iraq who is also a contributer to The New Republic writes (in an essay unfortunately behind a subscription firewall):
On a crowded street in a large Iraqi city, gunmen get out of an SUV and shoot a man in public. Nearby, muggers drag a driver out of his car and kidnap him. Across town, thugs demand protection money from businesses. Roadside bombs detonate with increasing frequency. The Iraqi police are either afraid or unwilling to tackle security problems, and the foreign troops in town are increasingly hunkering down, focusing more on their own safety than on enforcing order.
Sound like Baghdad? In fact, it's a normal day in Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, which has been under British control for the past ten months and supposedly was one of postwar Iraq's biggest success stories. The British government, as well as many members of the Western media, have touted Basra as an example of an occupation done right. But, in recent weeks, that image has begun to fade. British tactics are failing, and Basra's criminal mafias and warring political groups have asserted control over the city, leading to vigilante killings, rampant crime, and general insecurity. In fact, while the situation in Baghdad may be improving, in Basra it's only getting worse.
Britain's colonial past supposedly equipped London to handle Basra well. Thanks to years of experience in India, pre-World War II Iraq, and, more recently, Northern Ireland, the British allegedly have developed an agile army, capable of shifting quickly from war-fighting to winning local hearts and minds. "What makes the British so much more effective is their ability to turn on a dime," says one Western security expert.
At first, the Brits did do well. In the early days of the war, as American troops plowed north to Baghdad, British forces quickly moved into this city of 1.2 million and began establishing order. British officers spent much of their time befriending local tribal and religious leaders. They walked Basra's streets in berets rather than imposing helmets, as American troops do. They attempted to avoid aggressive tactics, such as raiding the homes of suspected insurgents, preferring to provide locals with incentives to turn in troublemakers. Overall, the British occupying force adopted a more laissez-faire attitude that allowed Iraqis to take local control sooner than in U.S.-run areas. The Basra city council, responsible for everything from sewers to appointing judges, was allowed to operate relatively independently, while in Baghdad most local functions remained in the hands of the occupying authorities. Policing of Basra's suburbs, too, was quickly placed in the hands of tribal leaders.
These tactics seemed to bring a quick payoff. The British got the electricity grid working several months before the lights fully came on in Baghdad, and they created a temporary sense of stability. Indeed, for about four months, Basra was relatively placid, with few attacks on soldiers or violence in the streets. Because of this relative security, stores stayed open late at night and business was brisk, store managers say. And the foreign media lavishly praised the Basra occupation. "While the American effort further north is being hampered each day by guerrilla resistance, Britain's civilizing mission has found fertile terrain in the south," London's The Sunday Times claimed in December. Basra's image became so pristine, in fact, that, after an initial round of encomiums, the Western media paid less attention to the city, not sending foreign reporters down from Baghdad as often.
But, over time, the British approach has faltered. Though handing power completely to Iraqis made the Brits popular at first, political parties here used the hands-off attitude to consolidate, and even abuse, their power. The British "are looking away," complained one foreign diplomat. "They are making it clear that they will not get their hands dirty." And, since Washington and London have refused to budge from their June goal of transferring total sovereignty to Iraqis, criminals and local leaders may believe they only have to wait a few months before British forces clear out and give them full reign over the city. Meanwhile, the Iraqi security forces in Basra have been unable to handle serious problems. Locals say the Iraqi police in Basra are resistant to get tough with lawbreakers for fear of retribution from criminals' tribes.
Worst of all, the Brits have failed to adequately vet the Iraqis to whom they hand power. In late January, it was revealed that the Badr Brigade of the Shia Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a leading political group, has been used as a secret police force in Basra with the permission and perhaps even oversight of the British authorities. The Brigade, which had a reputation for its harsh tactics in the past, allegedly has used its duty as secret police to engage in kidnapping and torture. Other corrupt local leaders have been allowed to take charge of critical local government functions and use them to steer business toward their friends and family. The British do nothing to stop this graft.
As a result, Basra has deteriorated. "Before I left [southern Iraq in December], I was telling my colleagues, 'You're in for real trouble,'" said one Western security expert. "Now it's happening." Indeed, even as Iraqi police in Baghdad have wrested back control of the capital's streets, Basra's security has continued to disintegrate, and locals say it is now as dangerous at night as in Baghdad. As their fear of British troops has diminished, criminal gangs have become bolder. Crime has surged, and a wave of smuggling by organized criminal networks has begun to hurt the local economy, raising prices on everything from gas to meat.
Meanwhile, parties with names like "God's Revenge," "God's Rules," and "Hezbollah" (no relation to the Lebanese group) have stockpiled weapons and now control much of the city. The Basra groups are larger and have many more men than the scattered Baathist insurgents in Baghdad. To get work in Basra today, locals say, you have to be connected with one of the groups. What's more, several of these Islamist militias, whose gunmen patrol the streets, have begun enforcing religious restrictions. Some liquor shops in town, most owned by Christian Iraqis, have been forced to close. The Islamic militias have shuttered music halls and movie theaters, and have commandeered many properties to serve as "Islamic meeting rooms" without compensating the previous owners. People who disobey the militias' requests have been shot.
