WHAT HAPPENED TO ERIC SHINSEKI?

The Washington Post reports today that former Iraqi administrator Amb. Jerry Bremer has made comments extremely critical of the way the war has been fought: in particular of the number of troops provided and the fact that looting was allowed to proceed. In retrospect (although retrospect is always perfect) it's clear that allowing the looting to go on the way it did was a bad, bad mistake -- although it's still isn't clear exactly what steps could have been taken, and how far they could have been enforced. How would the press have responded if soldiers began shooting Iraqis for looting?

But the reporters bring up another issue, and it's both the issue and their phrasing that I want to point out:

Prior to the war, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, said publicly that he thought the invasion plan lacked sufficient manpower, and he was slapped down by the Pentagon's civilian leadership for saying so. During the war, concerns about troop strength expressed by retired generals also provoked angry denunciations by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (My emph.)

"Slapped down" seems to me to be descriptive language that carries fairly heavy implications.

There has been so much said and written about the response to Gen. Shinseki's testimony that it's well worth taking a bit of time and looking back at the record. Shinseki testified on the 25th of February. Wolfowitz testified a few days later. Wolfowitz said that his numbers were "wildly off the mark," which you may well describe yourself as being "slapped down," but the reporter should provide the phrase and leave the conclusion to you.

Now, it's often said that the administration either "fired" or "retired" the General over his testimony. This is factually incorrect.

That is not to say that the Secretary of Defense and the General were best buds. He retired because it was time for him to retire -- tours as members of the Joint Chiefs simply don't last very long. After Army Chief of Staff, where, exactly, are you going to go?

What they did do, and it wasn't all that pretty, was make the announcement early, thus undercutting any power Shinseki might have: he was made a lame duck. But that fight wasn't over troop levels in Iraq, it was over Rumsfeld's determination to "transform" the military into a leaner, more mobile fighting force for the 21st century -- and you can disagree with the way that played out in Iraq, but the overall concept is hard to disagree with. Big tank battles across the desert are going to be less likely over the coming decades.

Shinseki is often described as himself a fan of transformation. Fair enough. But I'm not sure how, exactly, that's the case when he clung to the one system Rumsfeld managed to kill -- the Crusader. I mean, "lean" and "mobile" are not really words that come to mind. I mean, have you ever looked at the specs on the damn thing?

The other thing that gets forgotten is that under Shinseki there were Army folks involved in fairly actively attempting to block Rumsfeld with the Congress on the move to cut Crusader. There's no question there was lobbying. I'm talking about active duty Army officers sending documents to members of Congress to support a position contrary to that officially taken by the civilian leadership of the Pentagon. You know, independent of what the issue is, that's really a fairly outrageous violation of civilian control of the military. And, oh, by the way -- that was almost a year before the testimony that so many people imply was the cause of his retirement.

Shinseki is lionized now because he called for more troops and was shot down (hey, it's a blog, I can use loaded language.) But on his watch Army officers were pretty clearly off the reservation. Where's the condemnation of him for that?

I'd be happy if any Army folks with an opinion on this weighed in. I'm less interested in what you have to say about Crusader, since that's a done deal, then in how you feel about Shinseki, the way his retirement was handled, and this episode where Army folks were slipping documents to politicians.

One other thing, and this is probably just a personal thing with me. This is also reported in the article:

A Bremer aide said that his speeches were intended for private audiences and were supposed to have been off the record. Yesterday, however, excerpts of his remarks -- given at the Greenbrier resort at an annual meeting sponsored by the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers -- were distributed in a news release by the conference organizers.

I think that's just appalling. If there's an agreement with those hosting the presentation, the speaker has the right to expect that agreement will be honored. And isn't it interesting to note, by the way, that the press, willing to defend the need to protect confidentiality of sources under the most strained of circumstances, has no problem whatsoever reporting not-for-attribution comments if the poor sap making them has been screwed by his hosts. Hey, not their problem, right? After all, they came by it honestly.

Comments

[Bullshark]

In my part of the military there is/was a lot of hate for Shinseki. The present military is over loaded with officers. We now have more flag officers then we did at anytime except the height of WWII yet far fewer soldiers. The need for that number of officers is driven by equipment. As the military goes lighter fewer offs are needed. This seems to fuel the need to keep it big.
His biggest failing was to keep changing the requirments for the Interim force to keep the Stryker program alive and ahead of the competition. There are ties between his office and the civilian contractor that are documented.
After GEN Shelton, Shenseki was a disappointment which is why we have another Sec Ops guy in charge.

[dauber]

Thanks for the comment and the perspective. It is striking how his entire tour has been collapsed down into just that one day's testimony.

[Chris]

Unfortunately, we are also defining a mans career based on his late career activities in lobbying for certain military programs to survive "transformation"... which we are witnessing now is a floundering success. For all the armchair generals out there:

Eric Shinseki received two Purple Hearts and four Bronze Star Medals for his service in Vietnam.

If we have learned anything about anyone in history, even the greatest men have dark blotches in their background. This should not diminish thier achievments.

The fact that General Shinseki stood up and made an accurate statement about what post war Iraq occupation required, should go to remind everyone that the experienced commanders, not political appointees, should run the military.

[Jerry Lyons]

Vague derogatory comments such as "In my part of the military there is/was a lot of hate for Shinseki" and "There are ties between his office and the civilian contractor that are documented" are unfortunate because they are the kind of comments that are often made by people who dislike a person and are willing to attack him with vague and unsubstantiated criticism. What is meant by "my part of the military"? The word "hate" is often used by people who hate rather easily to apply to others who may disgree but hardly hate. "A lot of hate? How much is a lot? How many people did the writer encounter who used the word "hate"? I'm reminded of the story of the guy who said all indians walk in single file because I saw three of them yesterday and they were walking in single file. "Ties between his office and the civilian contractor. Such a meaningless and insidious remark. What kind of ties? Who in "his office"? Such garbage.

[David Nighthorse]

I had the opportunity to meet with the General at a luncheon. There, I spoke with his colleauges and former soldier both enlisted and officers who served with him. They had nothing but good things to say about him. The words "honorable, truthful," and "loyal" were the words that were commonly repeated about him. Before you begin to assertions you should have some evidence to back up your claims. These kinds of accusations seem to follow a pattern when it comes to those who support the war defend it without fail and do not acknowledge all the other factors that are associated with it as well as the mistakes that have been made.

[Justin Davis]

I was in the first Stryker unit to go into Iraq, OIF II/III. I was enlisted, and can't speak intelligently to the politics of flag leadership, but I can speak to the Stryker, which I nearly lived out of for a year.

The Stryker did not meet it's original objective; to be fully loaded with one infantry squad on a C-130; it's too heavy. But in Iraq, the Stryker was much faster, had almost zero maintenance and was more effective than it's tracked counterparts. We still have M113's rolling around Iraq, not to mention the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

To David Nighthorse... How did you happen to see Shinseki? Is he teaching at one of the Academies?

Justin Davis
justinpauldavis@yahoo.com