Inversion

I haven't had much to say about the retired generals attacking the SecDef, mostly because it's popped just as things have hit the fan around here, but I did notice that the Times was to be commended for a front page article that focused on an angle of the story that was being, it seemed to me, completely neglected by every other outlet, as near as I could tell: the idea of generals, retired or not, attacking a sitting SecDef, much less asking for his resignation, is deeply disturbing, and the simple fact that they're retired doesn't change things. Up until this article I've only seen this brought up in one buried quote from my colleague, Dick Kohn (pretty much the top expert in the country on civil-military relations) in one Post article.

But when I went to link to the Times article, I found a second Times article that basically inverts the concerns and arguments of the first one. This new one does not seem to be in the print edition; it seems to be a late addition. (Note they both come with the same photo, by the way.)

They do add, by the way, a defense of Rumsfeld by Tommy Franks' deputy, but my argument isn't intended as a defense of Rumsfeld on the merits. My argument is this: Kohn has a very serious argument here, and it's one that has been all but absent in the rush to give this small number of generals airtime and column inches. The fact that giving them attention then requires giving generals defending Rumsfeld space only proves Kohn's argument, it seems to me. The whole thing is a bad business.

Comments

[Reg Jones]

The question is when do you believe these Generals...

Example 1:
THEN: Batiste, 10/06/2004:
PHILLIPS [CNN]: General, while we watch the successful operations go down side by side with Iraqi troops, of course we continue to see a lot of violence throughout Iraq. We see children being targeted and, most recently, Ambassador Paul Bremer coming forward saying there was a mistake in the strategy in Iraq, and there just weren't enough troops post Saddam Hussein.Do you agree with that?

BATISTE: Let me answer that by saying that while we were conducting the operation in Samarra, at the same time we were conducting a battalion task force level air assault into an objective in the vicinity of Sharkak (ph), at the same time we were conducting a battalion level operation in the vicinity of Muqdadiyah. And at the same time, we were conducting a battalion level operation south of Balad. So, I think we had plenty of flexibility. Add to that the Iraqi security forces. They really do bring a lot to the fight now.

NOW: Batiste, 04/13/2006:
BATISTE:...It is much harder than warfare, and you need to have sufficient troops on the ground to control the people, to secure the borders, to intimidate the insurgency, to own the ground in every respect. My area in Iraq was the size of the state of West Virginia, huge. And we were forced over time to conduct a series of movements to contact where we only controlled the ground for a moment in time; that's not how you fight an insurgency. [NewHour, PBS]

Example 2:
THEN: Batiste, 12/24/2004:
Rumsfeld visits 1st Division in Tikrit. MajGen. Batiste: "It is an honor to welcome to the 1st Infantry Division our country's 23rd Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld. This is a man with the courage and the conviction to win the war on terrorism..."

AND:Batiste, 01/13/2005:
"Together with civic, tribal and religious leaders, the Iraqi security forces have achieved irreversible momentum towards prosperity and representative government. Based on the competencies of the Iraqi team, I am confident in the future of Iraq. We are right where we need to be in this important mission."

NOW: Batiste, 04/14/2006:
"We went to war with a flawed plan that didn't account for the hard work to build the peace after we took down the regime. We also served under a secretary of defense who didn't understand leadership, who was abusive, who was arrogant, who didn't build a strong team."

Example 3:
THEN: Swannack, 01/06/04:
I also can tell you that we're on a glide-path toward success as attacks against Task Force All American forces have decreased almost 60 percent over the past month... We have turned the corner, and now we can accelerate down the straightaway. There's still a long way to go before the finish line, but the final outcome is known. There certainly will be some friction along the way, but we will continue to kill or capture enemy forces, train Iraqi security forces to work independently, continue to create jobs, reduce the availability of weapons and ammunition, and finally, transfer the governance to local control that is legitimately recognized by the people."

A FEW MONTHS LATER: Swannack, WaPo, 05/09/2004:
Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, who spent much of the year in western Iraq, said he believes that at the tactical level at which fighting occurs, the U.S. military is still winning. But when asked whether he believes the United States is losing, he said, "I think strategically, we are."

Example 4 [Hat tip, American Thinker]:
THEN: Zinni, Feb. 2000
"Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf region. This is primarily due to its large conventional military force, pursuit of WMD, oppressive treatment of Iraqi citizens, refusal to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions...Despite claims that WMD efforts have ceased, Iraq probably is continuing clandestine nuclear research, retains stocks of chemical and biological munitions, … Even if Baghdad reversed its course and surrendered all WMD capabilities, it retains the scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure to replace agents and munitions within weeks or months...The Iraqi regime’s high regard for WMD and long-range missiles is our best indicator that a peaceful regime under Saddam Hussein is unlikely. ...extremists may turn to WMD in an effort to …overcome improved U.S. defenses against conventional attack. Detecting plans for a specific WMD attack is extremely difficult, making it likely such an event would occur without warning.

LATER: Zinni, Spring 2004
“I can't speak for all generals, certainly. But I know we felt that this situation was contained. Saddam was effectively contained. The no-fly, no-drive zones. The sanctions that were imposed on him,”

[Christopher Whitaker]

It IS strange to see them reverse themselves like that, but what i wonder is why? Is it just jilted-General syndrome, or is there something concrete to their criticism? The complete reorganization of the Army that SecDef Rumsfeld is doing is difficult and complicated and, no doubt, there is a lot of disagreement over it. There seem to be a lot of egos out there and I wonder why, suddenly, these Generals are speaking out so critically. Are they all Wesley Clark wannabe's? Or is there something deeper?

[Reg Jones]

And shouldn't someone be disclosing possible conflicts of interest:

Example 1:
Lt Gen Gregory Newbold [May 2002, UK Telegraph]:
A PENTAGON general with a key role in running the war against terrorism who was publicly chastised by Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, has suddenly requested early retirement. "It is a square hole and I am a round peg," said Lt Gen Gregory Newbold, who is stepping down as director of operations on the joint chiefs of staff and returning to civilian life in the summer. He suggested that he would be happier working in the power tools section of a DIY store."I'm looking forward to a job that doesn't have the intensity and lack the quality of life that this one has."
Gen Newbold, 53, did not mention Mr Rumsfeld in an interview with the Washington Post, but several sources said he had grown tired of the Pentagon chief's abrasive style.Things went wrong for Gen Newbold last October when he was being tried out as a Pentagon briefer and told reporters that "the combat power of the Taliban has been eviscerated". Although fellow officers said subsequent events proved him right, he was ridiculed for the comment. "He wishes he had not said that," said Mr Rumsfeld acidly. "I would not have said that."

Example 2:
Maj. Gen. John Riggs [Baltimore Sun, May 2005]:
"Riggs was told by senior Army officials that he would be retired at a reduced rank, losing one of his stars because of infractions considered so minor that they were not placed in his official record. He was given 24 hours to leave the Army. He had no parade in review, no rousing martial music, no speeches or official proclamations praising his decades in uniform, the trappings that normally herald a high-level military retirement...Les Brownlee, who was then acting Army secretary and who ordered that Riggs be reduced in rank, said he stands by the demotion. "I read the [Army inspector general's] report and made that judgment. I happen to think it was that serious. Maybe I have a higher standard for these things," Brownlee said in an interview. "I still believe it was the right decision." Rumsfeld's office had no comment for this story, referring all questions to the Army, which issued a statement. The two contracting infractions "reflected negatively on Lt. Gen. Riggs's overall leadership and revealed an adverse command climate," the Army statement said. "Based on the review of the investigation and Lt. Gen. Riggs's comments, the Acting Secretary of the Army [Brownlee] concluded that Lt. Gen. Riggs did not serve satisfactorily in the grade of lieutentant general."

Perhaps these generals were treated unfairly by the Pentagon. Perhaps, not. Perhaps their present opinions are totally independent from their past conflicts.

But shouldn't that be left for the reader to decide?

[Ron Hardin]

I think you'd be able to find a lot of assembler-language computer programmers from the 1950s who, if they were proficient in it, would denounce the compiler-generated code of the 1960s, and it's not a conflict of interest so much as knowing the old ways.

Perhaps not seeing the new needs.

[Christopher Whitaker]

In classically circuitous style, Ron has brought up a good point on which I, in classically verbose style will elaborate.

The military in general, and the Army in particular, has for most of its existance been configured and designed to fight large-scale, set-piece, force-on-force combat, as we would have done against the Soviets, and as we did, somewhat, against the Iraqi Army in Gulf I. However, the new reality is one of smaller, regional conflicts, as there is no-one, and I mean no-one, who can even come close to matching the combat power of the US military. With the best equipment and the best training available, the US military could crush anyone in a straight-up fight. However, knowing this, our current enemies are using guerilla and insurgency tactics against us, which the current force structure is NOT designed to fight against. This was illustrated in the Vietnam War where, while the US crushed the Viet Cong and NVA in every engagement, but still lost the war, primarily due to political factors. Iraq is a similar situation. Anytime US forces meet "insurgents" in battle, the insurgents are obliterated, thus the "insurgent" tactic of car-bombs, suicide bombers, and IED's. The greatest problem for the US military (of which, for the sake of disclosure I should note I am a member) is that it is going through the pains of changing its force structure from the Cold-War era sledgehammer approach, to the Brigade Combat Team rapier-like "leaner and meaner" approach of SecDef Donald Rumsfeld. There are always individuals, regardless of previous valorous service, that are unable or unwilling to keep pace with the necessary changes. These Generals are, very probably, among those persons. They understand the old ways, they prefer them and don't like change. I think this change is a good thing, as the current technology and tactics being developed and used allow smaller units to deliver firepower that it took units ten times their size to deliver previously. However, at the same time, the flexibility of the modular system allows tailoring of the BCT for the specific mission. It is complicated and difficult to adapt to the new system but I think in the long run, it will benefit the military, especially the Army.

[Topeka Satchel]

In his article, Michael Delong says:
"The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments."

Fair enough. But what is inexcusable is the refusal of this administration (Bush, Chaney, Rumsfeld, etc.) to deal constructively with these (and many other) developments. Instead of working with the situation as it changed (make that, deteriorated), Bush et al denied the seriousness of the changes and 'happy talked' while Baghdad burned. This process continues to this day.

History has not been kind to Robert McNamarra. I predict even worse for this administration, and we will all pay the price.

[davod]

Topeka:
"Happy talked while Baghdad burned." There are more than enough Americans willing to give aid and comfort to our enemies. Why should The Bush Administration add fuel to the fire. To use your own analogy - History will not be kind to those who run squealing to the MSM when their particular point of view does not win the argument.

The short sightedness of some and the calculated attacks on the Adminstration's prosecution of war and foreign policy for partisan political gain will be seen in years to come as one of the greatest crimes against America. Remember, some of the very Democrats who curse Bush's efforts with their every breath are the same politicians who cursed Reagan. Who does history remember. Not the whingeing naysayers that's for sure.

[Wayne]

Reg Jones: that is a remarkable piece of research! You are to be congratulated!

I will add this. When I served in the Pentagon it became something of a tradition for incoming administrations to fire or refuse to promote a few general officers based on the most minor of "offenses" - or simply on a whim - usually it was a USAF general. Apparantly this done was in order to establish who was boss.

The "W" adminstration did no such thing.

[hhhhh]

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